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A Rule for Determining When Patent
Misuse Should be Applied
Katherine E. White*
INTRODUCTION
The new Millennium brings with it a change in how vitally
innovative technology affects the global economy. With this
change, patent law is growing in importance. The manner in
which patented inventions are licensed and sold is crucial to the
direction of the new world economy. Anticompetitive effects in
patent license agreements or conditional sale restrictions should be
minimized, as they contravene public policy. To attain a balance
between granting exclusive patent rights to encourage
technological development and competition in the marketplace,
laws exist to curtail anticompetitive behavior. The contemporary
law of patents recognizes its own anticompetitive effects and
embeds the doctrine of patent misuse to limit these effects.
Focusing only on the level of competition in the market, the
antitrust laws police anticompetitive effect.
In recent years, there has been a shift away from applying patent
misuse. Because antitrust and patent misuse are derived from
different theoretical foundations, one should not completely
supplant the other. Patent misuse is a broader doctrine than
antitrust law. While an antitrust violation involving a patent
always constitutes patent misuse,1 one can have misuse without an
antitrust violation.2 Furthermore, some anticompetitive behavior
*
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1
Alan J. Weinschel and Robert P. Stefanski, Antitrust and Patent Misuse in
Licensing: Part I, 7 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 18, 18 (1995).
2
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969); Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffart, 803
F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Alan J. Weinschel and Robert P. Stefanski , 7 No. 11 J.
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still needs to be curtailed even when an antitrust violation cannot
be proven. 3
Patent misuse is a doctrine that seeks to balance the idea that a
patent is an absolute property right with the notion that a patent
must be exercised in a manner consistent with the public policies
underlying its grant.4 Because activities giving rise to patent
misuse often have actual or anticipated adverse effects on
competition, a close relationship exists between patent misuse and
antitrust law.5
Patent misuse differs from antitrust theory because the purpose
of misuse is to avoid extending the patent monopoly, while
antitrust law weighs the effect of acts on competition.6
Consequently, patent misuse has been used as a shield against
patent infringement and as an affirmative defense, while antitrust
claims have acted as a sword in litigation, with the potential for
recovery of treble damages under the Clayton Act.7
Though patent misuse and antitrust law are related, they should
not be conflated due to their separate origins. Patent misuse
springs from the common law doctrine of unclean hands, as well as
the public policy underlying patent law.8 The public policy behind
patent law is to grant exclusive rights to a new and nonobvious
invention for a limited time in exchange for its disclosure to the

PROPRIETARY RTS. 18,19 (1995).
3
Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140. See Robert Merges, Reflections on Current
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 795
(1988).
4
See Hensley Equip. Co., Inc. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1967)
(stating that “[t]he rationale of the doctrine is a rejection of the concept of the patent as an
absolute property right in favor of its definition as a right which must not be exercised in
a manner not consistent with the constitutionally-defined purpose for which it was
conferred, i.e., to ‘promote the Progress of the useful Arts.’” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8)).
5
Hensley, 383 F.2d at 261 (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
386, 415 (1945)) (“So long as the patent owner is using his patent in violation of the
antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of it by others.”).
6
See 6 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 19.04 [2], at 19-44-46, (2000)
(explaining that “[a]ntitrust analysis involves a balancing of patent interests and the
impact or likely impact of a practice on competition. The misuse doctrine compounds the
difficulty of balancing by substituting for competitive injury the vague concept of
“extension.”).
7
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
8
See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
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public.9
Theoretically, such disclosure will encourage and
facilitate competition in the market after the patent term expires.10
The patent laws, however, are not intended to extend exclusive
rights beyond the original scope of the patent.11
A patent is granted only on inventions that are new and
nonobvious.12 The patented invention is thereby “monopolized,”
kept from the public domain, yet is still able to contribute to
society.13 The patent misuse doctrine prohibits efforts by a
patentee that seek to extend a patent beyond the original scope of
its grant.14
In 1988, Congress limited, but did not eliminate, the doctrine of
patent misuse in the Patent Misuse Reform Act (“PMRA”).15 The
9

See Rite Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasoning
that “[a] patent is granted in exchange for a patentee’s disclosure of an invention, not for
the patentee’s use of the invention. There is no requirement in this country that a
patentee make, use or sell its patented invention.”) (emphasis added).
10
See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214-15
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[p]atent laws reward the inventor with the power to exclude
others from making, using or selling [a patented invention] . . . [m]eanwhile, the public
benefits both from the faster introduction of inventions and the resulting increase in
competition.”).
11
See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917) (stating that “[t]he scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in
the claims contained in it, read in light of the specification . . . [I]t is to the claims of
every patent, therefore, that we must return to when we are seeking to determine what the
invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to the inventor by the grant provided for
by the statute, — ‘He can claim nothing beyond them.’” (citing Keystone Bridge Co. v.
Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278)).
12
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1995).
13
See Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 239, 251 (1993) (citations omitted). The late Honorable Giles S. Rich, former
Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, discussed this
reconciliation as follows:
The patent and antitrust laws are reconcilable — and easily so. If the
thing monopolized is in the public domain before the creation of the
monopoly in it, the monopoly is odious, illegal, bad. If the thing is a
new and unobvious contribution to society, a temporary monopoly is
a fair quid pro quo for society to pay as a reward or inducement to the
inventor and those who took the financial risk of commercializing the
thing in order to make it available to society. This principle is, at the
same time, what undergirds the law as to what may be patented, the
law on patentability. The thing patented must be new and
[non]obvious.
Id.
14
Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140; Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491; Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith, 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947).
15
Codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
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PMRA was adopted to soften the type of harsh patent misuse
outcome where “[a] patent owner loses the right to enforce his
patent, at least until the conduct that has constituted the misuse has
ceased and its effects have been purged.”16 Prior to the PMRA,
courts had been applying patent misuse inconsistently, deciding
analogous cases differently and finding misuse in situations where
there was no anticompetitive effect.17 Often, misuse was found
where the conduct had not injured the infringing party who raised
misuse as a defense.18 In response, Congress carved out two
exceptions where patent misuse would no longer apply without a
showing of market power in the relevant market: (1) refusals to
license; and (2) tying cases.19 However, requiring a showing of
market power in these two areas has had an anticompetitive effect
and almost merges the analysis for patent misuse into an antitrust
rule of reason analysis. Though Congress contemplated that these
modifications would have a pro-competitive effect on licensing,
insofar as they would require some linkage between patent
licensing practice and anticompetitive conduct,20 this has not been
the case.
Courts, however, have narrowed the scope of patent misuse
beyond the level Congress dictated.21 This limitation has allowed
courts to aid and abet patentees in expanding the rights under their
patents beyond that legally allowed under prior case law, even
taking into account legislative changes.22 Some restrictions may
still amount to patent misuse violations while not rising to the level
of antitrust violations.23 One such example of this problem is
when a patent holder restricts the use of a patented device to a
16
134 CONG. REC. S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Merges supra note 3, at 795.
17
See supra note 16.
18
See id.
19
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (1994).
20
134 CONG. REC. H10646 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
21
See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(where restricting patented medical device to single use did not violate the doctrine of
patent misuse).
22
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Comment: The Economic Irrationality of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L REV. 1599, 1601-07 (discussing how courts have extended
the rights of patentees by failing to enforce the antitrust laws against them).
23
See id. at 1611, n.83 (explaining that nonmetered royalties, refusal to license,
resale field of use limitations and grant-back clauses amount to patent misuse, but are not
antitrust violations unless they constitute tying arrangements with market power).
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single use.24 These restrictions often venture beyond the original
scope of the patent, and consequently amount to patent misuse as
historically contemplated by the case law, taking into account the
1988 statutory changes.25
This Article proposes a test for determining when patent misuse
should be applied. After reviewing the pertinent case law, this
Article will demonstrate that courts have eroded the patent misuse
doctrine beyond what is required statutorily, without deriving any
added pro-competitive benefit as contemplated under the PMRA.
Such erosion has assisted patentees in masking anticompetitive
effects that could be lessened by proper application of patent
misuse. An example of this problem is Mallinckrodt v. Medipart,
Inc.26 where the Federal Circuit labeled a patent holder’s single use
restriction as a field of use restriction not amounting to per se
antitrust or misuse violations but subject to the rule of reason.27
After Mallinckrodt, contrary to the intent of its holding, single use
restriction cases have been decided based on legal doctrines that
fail to weigh pro-competitive versus anticompetitive behavior, e.g.,
the repair/reconstruction doctrine.28 Such analysis thwarts the
ability to sufficiently balance between the exclusive patent right
and competition in the market.
Part I discusses the historical treatment of the Patent Misuse
doctrine up to the current treatment after the 1988 Amendments.
Part II proposes a test for when patent misuse should be applied
and examines the Federal Circuit cases where single use
restrictions were evaluated. It also compares the court’s analysis
with the legal approach used when applying the proposed test. Part
III concludes that since courts have eroded the historical
application of patent misuse without deriving any added procompetitive benefit, a specific rule should be implemented that
finds patent misuse when (1) a reuse restriction is not made with
respect to a separate product and (2) where the restriction forces
24

See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917) (restricting consumer use of patented machine to unpatented films was an invalid
attempt at extending patentee’s monopoly to products that he had not patented).
26
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
27
Id.
28
See Hon. Arthur J. Gajarsa et al., How Much Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius?
Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 1205 (1999).
25
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the buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in fixed
proportion to the patented device since the life span of the device
outlasts the single use.
I. MISUSE
The doctrine of patent misuse began as an affirmative defense to
patent infringement.29 This defense emerged from the equitable
affirmative defense of “unclean hands.”30 The unclean hands
doctrine is “invoked by a court only when a plaintiff otherwise
entitled to relief has acted so improperly with respect to the
controversy . . . that the public interest in punishing the plaintiff
outweighs the need to prevent defendant’s tortious conduct.”31
The related patent misuse doctrine requires that the alleged
infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect.32 Patent misuse does not affect a patent’s
validity. Once the patentee has purged the anticompetitive
behavior, the patent may again be enforced through infringement
suits.33

29
Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing BioRad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument, 739 F.2d 604, 617 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
30
United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957)
(stating that patent misuse is an extension of the doctrine of unclean hands); Morton Salt,
314 U.S. at 492-93 (linking patent misuse to the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands”);
C.R. Bard Sys. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting the defense
of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands); B. Braun Medical,
Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Merges, supra note 3, at 797.
The doctrine of unclean hands, however, differs from patent misuse in important ways.
First, the patent misuse doctrine applies to suits in law, where damages are sought, as
well as suits in equity, where injunctive relief is sought. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
& Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 185 (1980); see Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2, at 18; see
Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1599, 1607-20 (1990); P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 184-85
(1987) (describing remedies generally available in antirust cases).
31
B.M.I., Inc. v. Hearst, 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
32
Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
33
Hensley Equip. Co., 383 F.2d at 261; see, e.g., United States Gypsum, 352 U.S. at
465.
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There are two types of patent misuse:34 (1) an antitrust violation
that is significantly related to the patent;35 and (2) an act whereby
the patentee has sought to extend the patent beyond the original
scope of its grant, not necessarily amounting to an antitrust
violation.36 One of the most illustrative cases discussing the patent
misuse doctrine is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.37
In Morton Salt, the court reflected on the reason for the patent
grant and the importance of limiting the patentee’s monopoly
protection so that it extends only within that grant:38
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege
of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy
adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive Right . . .’ to their ‘new and
useful’ inventions . . . .39 But the public policy,
which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly, excludes from it all that is not embraced
in the invention.40 It equally forbids the use of the
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and
which it is contrary to public policy to grant.41
34

Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 641-42 (1985).
See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945) (noting
that “[s]o long as the patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he
cannot restrain infringement of it by others.”).
36
The Supreme Court has never required that an antitrust violation be proven to
establish patent misuse. See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140; Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at
491; Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 329 U.S. at 641. See also 134 CONG. REC. H10,
646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenheimer) (stating that [t]he term
“market power” is used in the [Patent Misuse Act] in order to permit the courts to
reasonably assess the potential for anticompetitive effect of a particular practice. We
have chosen not to explicitly guide the courts as to the level of “market power” required
for a finding of misuse. We do expect, however, that the courts will be guided - though
not bound - by post and future decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of antitrust
analysis of unlawful tie-ins.) (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2 (1984); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)).
37
314 U.S. 488.
38
Id. at 492.
39
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.).
40
Id. at 492; see also International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96
(stating that the patents conferred no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt;
thus no antitrust immunity attached).
41
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492; see also International Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-96.
35
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The Court went on to say that where a patentee is using its patent
to restrain competition in the sale of unpatented products, the
underlying policy of granting patents is thwarted.42 As such,
“[e]quity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the
patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement.”43
Furthermore, the court should continue to withhold assistance until
the anticompetitive practice is abandoned and the effects of the
patent misuse have been purged.44
The Court then applied this rule to the facts in the case. In
Morton Salt, the patent holder patented a machine for depositing
salt tablets that was useful in the canning industry.45 The trial
court found that the patentee tied the lease of its patented machines
to the purchase of unpatented salt tablets that were specifically
designed for use in the patented salt-dispensing machines.46 This
tying thereby assisted in creating a limited monopoly in the salt
tablets. Such monopolization was not within the patent grant,
which only gave the patentee an exclusive right to make, use, and
vend the machine described and claimed in the patent.47
On appeal, the Court stated that “a patent affords no immunity
for a monopoly not within the patent grant.”48 The use of a patent
“to suppress competition in the sale of an unpatented article may
deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity to restrain an
alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.”49 The Morton
Salt Court held that the patentee could not claim protection of the
patent grant to avoid an antitrust violation.50 The Court further
held that the patentee’s infringement suit was against public policy,
and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of patentee’s complaint for
want of equity.51 Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Court
to decide whether the plaintiff had violated the Clayton Act.52 In
other words, the patent misuse defense was used as a defense to
42

Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 493, construed in Berlenbach v. Anderson and Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d
782, 784 (9th Cir. 1964).
44
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
45
Id. at 488.
46
Id. at 491.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 491.
50
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
51
Id.
52
Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
43
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patent infringement, without having to prove an antitrust violation
under the Clayton Act.53
Over the years, there have been complaints that patent misuse
has become overreaching, applying to situations that go beyond
those intended.54 Courts have been inconsistent in their application
of the doctrine to analogous practices. Furthermore, misuse has
been found where conduct has had no anticompetitive effect55 or
where the conduct has not injured the infringing party who raised
misuse as a defense.56
In response to these concerns, the United States Senate passed a
bill requiring that a “court find a violation of the antitrust laws,
after undertaking an economic analysis, before it can find a patent
53

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.5b at 218 (1994).
54
See 134 CONG. REC. H10, 646-02 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenheimer) (stating that the patent misuse doctrine was developed to address
anticompetitive effects in patent licensing agreements but has extended its application to
covenants not to compete, price-fixing, resale price maintenance, and grant backs). See
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohn and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 917, 201 (1980) (stating “a patentee
may sell a nonstaple article . . . while enjoining others from marketing that same good
without authorization.”); See Mercoid Co. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. 320 U.S. 661, 664
(1944) (holding a patentee could not prevent a competitor from making an unpatented
switch used in a patented combination, even if the switch could only be sued to infringe
patentee’s patent). See L. Peter Farkas, Can a Patent Still be Misused?, 59 ANTITRUST
L.J. 677, 679-80 (1990-91) (revealing several facts in Morton Salt that indicated that its
leases did not substantially lessen competition:
(a) the existence of alternatives to the patented machines;
(b) Morton Salt’s [alleged infringer’s] identical tying provision;
(c) the availability to Suppiger’s [patentee’s] lessees of competing machines
and the lessees’ freedom to use any salt tablets they desired with those
machines;
(d) the small volume of salt used in the canning field in comparison to the salt
business as a whole;
(e) the fact that Suppiger’s [patentee’s machines] could be used for purposes
other than depositing salt; and
(f) the $30 annual rental per machine, which could not be called a sham or a
coverage to monopolize the sale of unpatented salt.).
(citing G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1941).
55
See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 201; Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 664; Morton Salt,
117 F.2d at 968.
56
134 CONG. REC. S17, 146-02 (daily ed. October 21, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (discussing S. 1200 and S. 438). Patent misuse is a doctrine that could benefit
from having a standing requirement that the misuse must directly effect the party raising
the affirmative defense. Historically, there has been no standing requirement. This has
caused substantial concern that the patent misuse doctrine is overbroad and overreaching.
Id.
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holder guilty of patent misuse.”57 The House, however, did not
adopt this bill. Instead, a compromise between the two houses was
reached with Congress concentrating instead on preventing two
categories of activity from being subject to patent misuse: (1) the
refusal to use or license; and (2) the tying of a patented product to
another separate product.58 Finally, in 1988, the PMRA was
signed into law .59
Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5),60 the PMRA does not
address when conduct falling outside the statute can amount to
patent misuse without an antitrust violation.61 After PMRA’s
passage, there has been a pervasive perception that patent misuse is
“dead,”62 and has been replaced with the antitrust rule of reason
analysis.63 The PMRA, however, only eliminates a finding of
patent misuse, without showing market power in the relevant
market, in two situations, not all circumstances.64 The Act states
that a patentee:
[O]therwise entitled to relief for direct or
contributory infringement shall not be deemed
guilty of patent misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having . . . (5)
conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of
a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power
57

134 CONG. REC. H10, 646-02 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenheimer) (discussing differences between S. 438 and the bill before the House).
58
Id.
59
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73 (102 Stat. 4674) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994)). See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (1994). Subsections 4 and
5 of 271(d) were added by § 201 of Public Law 100-703, the Patent and Trademark
Authorization Act, approved Nov. 19 1988. Subsection 4 relates to a patentee’s ability to
refuse to license his or her patent without being deemed guilty of patent misuse. For
purposes of this Article, subsection 4 is not pertinent.
60
35 U.S. § 271 (d) (1994).
61
Id.
62
See Farkas, supra note 54; see also Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
63
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708 (stating that the appropriate criterion for
determining whether there is patent misuse, when a restriction reaches beyond the patent
grant, is whether or not the restriction is justifiable under the rule of reason). PSC Inc. v.
Symbol Tech., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating alleged patent misuse
must be evaluated in accordance with the rule of reason).
64
Cf., Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 218 (stating that “claims of anticompetitve
patent misuse are best tested by the antitrust laws).
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in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.65
A. Tying Arrangements
A primary reason for Congress making this change concerning
tying arrangements was the belief that doing do would have a procompetitive effect in the market place. Allowing patent holders to
engage in certain licensing activity can promote competition and
should be allowed in such circumstances.66 To better understand
this point, it is necessary to examine the typical situation in which
tying arrangements occur. The basic logic of all tying cases is that
the tying product is the product everyone wants, while the tied
product is the product buyers are forced to purchase in order to
receive the tying product. An unlawful tying arrangement
prohibited by the antitrust laws67 is established by showing:
(1) there are separate products; (2) the purchase of
one (the tying product) is conditioned on the
purchase of the other (the tied product); (3) the
65

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (emphasis added).
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984), noted in
4 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 1, 29-31. (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
which she stated “that a legal ‘monopoly’ such as a patent should not be presumed to
create market power in the tying product”).
67
Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to make a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption
or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in
the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where
the effect of such . . . sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C.§ 14 (1982).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 23
n.39 (stating that the standard of analysis is the same under the Clayton Act as the
Sherman Act). See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: Blessed
Be the Tie?, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26-27 (1991).
66
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tying product’s market power appreciably restrains
free competition in the tied product’s market; and
(4) a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce in the
tied product is affected.68
When these elements are shown, the tying arrangement is per se
illegal.69 Using the term, per se illegal is a misnomer, however,
since market power in the relevant market must be shown in order
to prove an antitrust violation.70 Market power has been defined as
the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would not
do in a competitive market.”71 It is the ability of a single seller to
raise prices and restrict output.72 In tying situations, market power
is determined by whether or not the seller has the power “to raise
prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with
respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.”73
The anticompetitive effects in tying come from having economic
leverage in the tying product. This gives the seller the ability to
force a buyer into either purchasing a tied product “that the buyer
either did not want . . . or might have preferred to purchase
elsewhere on different terms.”74
On the other hand, when the tying and tied product are
consumed in fixed proportions, the possibility of economic
leverage in the tying product is absent because it is not possible to
make a monopoly profit on the tied product.75 If the tied product is
sold in fixed proportion to the tying product, generally only a
competitive profit, and not a monopoly profit, is earned. If,
however, the tied product is not sold in fixed proportion to the
tying product, a monopoly profit can be earned on the tied
68
Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 26-27 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-18; Fortner Enters. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969) [hereinafter Fortner I]; Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc.
852 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
69
Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 27.
70
Id.
71
504 U.S. at 464 (1992) (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14).
72
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992)
(citing Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503).
73
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 504. See Burchfiel, supra note 67 at 28.
74
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. See Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 28.
75
See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L. J. 19, 21-23 (1957); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610,
617 (1977) [hereinafter Fortner II] (citing Bowman supra for the proposition that
economic leverage would not be possible because credit and prefabricated housing were
sold in fixed proportions).
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product.76
For example, if a patent holder sells golf club woods as a tying
product and sells irons as a tied product, the clubs are sold in fixed
proportion to each other. Presumably, there would be no need to
buy irons more frequently than woods. If, however, the golf balls
are the tied products, they would not be sold in fixed proportion to
the woods. The amount of golf balls needed would have no
correlative relationship to the amount of woods needed. This way
a seller is able to charge more to those who use the clubs more
frequently, thus needing more golf balls, than those who use them
less.77 Consequently, the seller obtains a monopoly profit on the
golf balls.78 In a situation where the tying product is patented,
extending the patent monopoly to an unpatented tied product
excludes other sellers from the opportunity to sell to the patent
holder’s customers.79
Despite the possible anticompetitive effects of tying cases,
Congress requires that market power in the relevant market be
shown to find patent misuse.80 Making this change for tying
arrangements allows patent holders to engage in certain licensing
activities that can have pro-competitive effects. Field of use
restrictions are an example of a licensing activity having the
potential to promote competition.
A field of use restriction prohibits a licensee from realizing the
benefits of the license in certain technical fields.81 For example, a
license may restrict the use of a pharmaceutical to only veterinary
applications, subjecting the licensee to liability if he or she uses the
licensed pharmaceutical on humans or for any other non-veterinary
application.82

76

See THOMAS D. MORGAN,
AND ITS ORIGINS 331-32 (1994).
77

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON

MODERN ANTITRUST LAW

Id. at 332; see also Bowman, supra note 75, at 23.
Thomas D. Morgan, Remarks at a George Washington University Law School
Antitrust Lecture (Feb. 23, 1995).
79
If, however, the tied product is patented, the patent holder would have a right to
restrict its use. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). This right to exclude is, in part, based on the fact
that what is patented has contributed something new and nonobvious and has been
disclosed to the public.
80
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
81
See 6-19 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 at 31-38 (2000).
82
Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-Use Restrictions as Pro-competitive Elements in
Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United States and the European
78
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Such pro-competitive effects, however, do not occur when a
patentee restricts the sale of a patented invention to a single use, in
cases where the use of such a device is not claimed as part of the
patented invention.83 In these cases, single use restrictions have
been masked as “field of use” restrictions.84 Field of use
restrictions provide an important pro-competitive purpose since
they allow patentees to license in different markets with varying
market demand at commensurate royalty fees.85
One of the most crucial circumstances that § 271(d)(5) does not
address is when a product is sold with a “single use only”
restriction. A single use restriction is not a restriction based on the
purchase of a separate product, and a second use of the same
product is not a separate product. It is not possible for a product
having one physical substantiation to be a separate product. In a
context where the use of a patented invention is not claimed, a
single use restriction can create an excessive return on the patent.86
When a single use restriction is employed, § 271(d)(5) is not
immune to the application of patent misuse.87 A single use
restriction on a patented product, where the use of the product is
not patented does not meet the pro-competitive goals of use
restrictions. These situations are analogous to a purchaser buying
golf clubs, but only being allowed to use them for one round of
golf, even though there is plenty of life left in the clubs. Single use
only restrictions allow the patentee to keep economic leverage and
force a purchaser to buy another product when a new one is
unnecessary.
Given these anticompetitive effects, patent misuse should be
applied in cases where the restriction on reuse is not made with
respect to a separate product, and where the restriction forces the
Communities, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 364, 366 (1991).
83
See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 81, at 31-38.
84
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703.
85
See Meyers, supra note 82 at 367-69 (discussing how field of use restrictions
encourage patentees to enter both high and low demand markets when the royalty fees
can be charged commensurately with demand).
86
See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491 (stating a “patent affords no immunity for a
monopoly not within the grant); International Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-6 (stating a patent
affords no antitrust immunity over unpatented salt); Aro Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336, 339-340, 345 (1961) [hereinafter Aro I]
(concluding that a patent did not confer a monopoly over an unpatented element of the
combination).
87
Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
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buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in fixed
proportion to the patented device. Accordingly, a “market power
rule of reason” analysis is not required under § 271(d)(5) for single
use restrictions where a second use of the sold product is not based
on a purchase of a separate product.88
A case illustrative of the situation described above is
Mallinckrodt v. Medipart.89
In Mallinckrodt, the patentee,
inscribed a “Single Use Only” restriction on its patented device90
and the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in holding
that the restriction on reuse was unenforceable under the patent
law,91 stating that:
If the sale of the [embodiment of the patented
device] was validly conditioned under the
applicable law such as the law governing sales and
licenses, and if the restriction on reuse was within
the original scope of the patent grant or otherwise
justified, then violation of the restriction may be
remedied by action for patent infringement.92
In this case, Mallinckrodt owned a patent on an “apparatus for
delivering radioactive and therapeutic material in aerosol mist form
to the lungs of a patient.”93 This device was used for diagnosis and
treatment of pulmonary disease.94 Mallinckrodt manufactured and
sold this device to hospitals as a unitary kit, with a “Single Use
Only” restriction notice inscribed on the device.95 Furthermore,
the instructions dictated that the entire apparatus be disposed of in
Some
accordance with biohazardous waste procedures.96
88
But see Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating “[w]hen a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se
patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by 271(d), a court must
determine if that practice is ‘reasonably within the patent grant.’”) (quoting Mallinckrodt,
976 F.2d at 708)).
89
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700.
90
Id. at 701.
91
Id.; see also Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding Mallinckrodt’s “Single Use Only” restriction is not enforceable by way of
a suit for patent infringement).
92
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703.
93
Id. at 701.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 701-2.
96
Id. at 702. Note that any health and safety concerns can be covered by limiting
express and implied warranties of the patented product beyond a single use.
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hospitals, however, did not dispose of the patented device as
instructed or limit its use to a single use.97 Instead, they shipped
the used patented devices to Medipart.98
Medipart then
reconditioned the patented devices and sent them back to the
respective hospitals.99 Consequently, Mallinckrodt sued Medipart
for patent infringement and inducement to infringe.100 Both parties
then moved for summary judgment.101
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment finding that the violation of the single use restriction
could not be remedied under patent law.102 Instead, the trial court
said that this was a case of patent exhaustion, a doctrine stating
that after sale, title passes, and that once the “patent owner has
received the consideration he is due . . . his rights to control the
future use of his invention come to an end.”103 The court then
granted defendants motion, “holding that the ‘Single Use Only’
restriction could not be enforced by suit for patent
infringement.”104 In other words, even if the notice restriction was
sufficient as a conditional sale, violation of that condition could
not be remedied under patent law.105
Mallinckrodt, on appeal, argued that its restriction on single use
was merely a specified field of use restriction, wherein the field is
a single (i.e. disposable) use.106 As such, Mallinckrodt contended
that this restriction did not enlarge the original scope of its
patent.107 In addition, Mallinckrodt argued that the “Single Use
Only” restriction was reasonable because it was made for health
and safety reasons and violated no public policy.108 Mallinckrodt
therefore concluded that its restriction should be a valid and
97

Id.
Mallincrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
99
Id. These reconditioned units still bore the Mallinckrodt trademarks and the
“Single Use Only” restriction. The units were also not tested for residual biological
activity or for radioactivity. Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 701.
102
Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1120-21.
103
See id. at 1114 (citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873)).
104
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
105
Id. at 703.
106
Id.
107
Id. (arguing that “a single patient use is valid and enforceable under the patent law
because the use is within the scope of the patent grant, and the restriction does not
enlarge the patent grant”).
108
Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1120-21.
98
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enforceable restriction under patent law.109
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that if a patentee’s “Single
Use Only” restriction was a valid condition of sale and did not per
se violate the doctrine of patent misuse or antitrust law, provided
that no other law prevented enforcement of the patent.110 The
court reasoned that the appropriate criterion was to determine
whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction was “reasonably within the
patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the
patent grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not
justifiable under the rule of reason.”111 Furthermore, the court held
that if the single use restriction was valid, then “even repair of an
unlicensed device constitutes infringement.”112
The single use only restriction in Mallinckrodt does not fall
within § 271(d)(5). Here, Mallinckrodt did not tie the sale of the
patented product to the purchase of “a separate product.”113
Instead, Mallinckrodt tied the sale of the patented product to a
single use of the patented product.114 The uses are being sold in
fixed proportion to the purchase of the patented product, even
though the product has a life span beyond one use.115
Consequently, such a reuse restriction goes beyond the patent
grant. Because this is not a tying case, market power in the tying
product under the rule of reason is not required in evaluating it.
The Federal Circuit noted that Mallinckrodt was not a tying
case,116 however the court may have been influenced by §
271(d)(5) in deciding this case. The court noted that the rule of
reason was the appropriate criterion for determining whether
109

Mallincrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
Id. at 708.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 709 (referring to Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476, 480 (1964) [hereinafter Aro II]. This reference, however, is somewhat
misplaced. Here, the Court was talking about direct infringement existing because Ford
did not have a license to make the convertible tops. The fact that defendant, Aro, made
the repairs should not be any more of an infringement based on Ford’s actions.
113
Id. at 709. In other words, if a purchaser bought the mist to refill the patented
invention, this refilling would not violate the restriction. It is only the use of the refilled
invention that would exceed the limitation.
114
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
115
See id.
116
Id. at 708 (emphasizing that this case was not a price-fixing or tying case, and the
per se antitrust and misuse violations should not be applied).
110
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Mallinckrodt’s single use restriction was justifiably within the
patent grant or had ventured “into behavior having anticompetitive
effect.”117 In actuality, § 271(d)(5) does not address this situation,
as the single use restriction was not placed on a separate
product.118 The broader question is whether there can be a single
use restriction characterized as a specific field of use that is not
patent misuse.
Following Mallinckrodt, single use restriction cases have been
decided under legal doctrines that do not address the procompetitive issues Congress attempted to stimulate in the
PMRA.119 Post-Mallinckrodt cases have been decided using the
permissible repair versus impermissible reconstruction doctrine.120
Under this doctrine, a patent on a combination of elements “covers
only the totality of the elements in the claim and . . . no element,
separately viewed, is within the grant.”121 As the Supreme Court
has stated:
No element, not itself separately patented, that
constitutes one of the elements of a combination
patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however
essential it may be to the patented combination and
no matter how costly or difficult replacement may
be.122
A purchaser of a patented invention is entitled to replace nonpatented “spent” parts that amount to permissible repair.123 The
117

See id.; 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(5) (1994).
There was a bill in the Senate, S.1200, that would have limited the patent misuse
defense to cases in which an antitrust violation existed, but this was not adopted. See 134
CONG. REC. S14,434-03 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 134 CONG.
REC. H10,646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenheimer); 134 CONG.
REC. S17,146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Thus, the patent
misuse doctrine should only be limited as much as Congress intended to limit it. See In
re Recombinant DNA, 850 F.Supp.769, 774 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
119
See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also
Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, 165 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Image
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); see also B.
Braun Med. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Zeneca, Ltd. v.
Pharmachemie B.V., 37 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 1999).
120
See, e.g., supra note 119.
121
Aro I, 365 U.S. at 344.
122
Id. at 345.
123
Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923) (asserting that the
patented machine lasts indefinitely, while the bands are exhausted after a limited use and
must be replaced); see also Aro I, 365 U.S. at 345 (holding that the “[m]ere replacement
118
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term “spent” refers to the idea that the replacement parts have
reached their life span, or have worn out;124 however, the purchaser
may not impermissibly reconstruct the patented device.125
Patent monopoly is ‘exhausted’ by the first authorized sale of the
of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or
different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to [permissibly]
repair his property.”); see also Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., 85 F.3d 1570,
1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that the “‘use of the whole’ of the combination which a
purchaser buys, and [replacement of worn-out parts] is but an exercise of the right ‘to
give duration to that which he owns’”); see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., 45
F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasoning that permissible repair encompasses any
repair necessary for maintaining the use of the whole of the patented combination
through replacing a spent part); see also Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (agreeing with defendant that replacing a worn or spent part in a patented
combination constitutes [permissible] repair and not reconstruction).
124
See Everpure, 875 F.2d 300.
125
Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 123 (Mem) (1850) (stating “when the material of
the [patented] combination ceases to exist . . . the right to renew it depends upon the right
to make the invention. If [that] right does not exist, there is no right to [reconstruct the
invention]”). See also American Cotton-Tie v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (explaining
why the defendants did not make a permissible repair, but an impermissible
reconstruction.)
What the defendants did in piecing together the pieces of the old band
was not a repair of the band or the tie, in any proper sense. The band
was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cotton-mill because
the tie had performed its function of confining the bale of cotton in its
transit from the plantation or the press to the mill. Its capacity for use
as a tie was voluntarily destroyed. As it left the bale it could not be
used again as a tie. As a tie the defendants reconstructed it, although
they used the old buckle without repairing that. The case is not like
putting new cutters into a planing-machine, as in Wilson v. Simpson,
9 How. 109, in place of cutters worn out by use. The principle of that
case was that temporary parts wearing out in a machine might be
replaced to preserve the machine in accordance with the intention of
the vendor, without amounting to a reconstruction of the machine.
Id.
See also Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining
an example regarding an impermissible reconstruction.)
Moreover, the nature of the work done by E.J. shows that retipping is
more like reconstruction than like repair. E.J. does not just attach a
new part for a worn part, but rather must go through several steps to
replace, configure and integrate the tip onto the shank. It has to break
the worn or damaged tip from the shank by heating it to 1300 degrees
Fahrenheit. It brazes to the shank a new rectangular block of carbide
and grinds and machines it to the proper diameter and creates the
point. Thereafter, the tip is honed and sharpened, grinding the rake
surfaces and the center of the point and honing the edges. These
actions are effectively a re-creation of the patented invention after it
is spent.
Id.
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patented item, and patent law does not protect attempts by the
patentee or his licensees to control use of the product after such
sale.126 Permissible repair is normally confined to repairing spent
(i.e., worn or broken) parts while impermissible reconstruction is
limited to situations where the entity, viewed as a whole, has
become spent.127
The post-Mallinckrodt single use only restriction cases, which
have been decided on the basis of the repair versus reconstruction
doctrine, have expanded what constitutes “spent,” while the
category unpatented components which have reached the end of
their lifespan, has broadened.128 Permissible repairs now include
the replacement of unworn or even unused components of a
patented combination.129 Such expansion is confusing and does
126

See Hensley, 383 F. 2d at 263 (citing United States v. Univis Lens. Co., 316 U.S.
241 (1942). See also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917), overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
127
Aro I, 365 U.S. at 342-43 (1961) (stating: “[I]t is ‘the use of the whole’ of the
combination which a purchaser buys, and . . . repair or replacement of the worn-out,
damaged or destroyed part is but an exercise of the right ‘to give duration to that which
he owns, or has a right to use as a whole.’”)
(quoting Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 123 (1850)).
Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. Ill.) (stating
“[u]nder [the repair doctrine], a customer may replace or repair worn or broken
unpatented parts of a patented combination”), aff’d Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs.
Corp., 41 F.3d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
128
See Gajarsa supra note 28.
129
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1445,
1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding permissible repair where the parts were completely unused
and unworn, while noting that the modifications were not conventional repair.)
While there is no bright-line test for determining whether a
modification is a “reconstruction” sufficient to infringe a patent
owned by the seller of the product, on the undisputed facts in this
case, we agree with the district court that [defendant, ROT] has not
reconstructed the cartridges. ROT’s modification of the caps of HP’s
cartridges is more akin to permissible “repair” than to impermissible
“reconstruction”.
Id.; see also Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at 1576 (stating that [i]n sum, although the pressure
sleeves were not physically worn-out, they were effectively spent because of the risk of
contamination between successive patients. Replacement of the sleeves after each use
was necessary, as a practical matter, for Kendall’s customers to continue to use the
complete [patented system]); Sage, 45 F.3d at 1578.
It might be prudent to replace an expendable element before it has
been completely exhausted . . . . This court has never said that an
element is spent only when it is impossible to reuse it. Like the
district court, we believe that when it is neither practical nor feasible
to continue using an element that is intended to be replaced, that
element is effectively spent.
Id. (citing Everpure, 875 F.2d at 303).
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not address Congress’ intent for restrictions to stimulate
competition for patented inventions.
Another drawback of analyzing single use only restriction cases
under the permissible repair versus impermissible reconstruction
doctrine is that the courts are forced to look to the intent of the
patentee.130 This is often precarious since it is difficult to prove
the subjective intent of the patentee. In addition, intent should not
be an element in a judicial test for direct infringement as
knowledge of infringement is not a required element in 35 U.S.C. §
271 (a).131 There are also severe inconsistencies in the existing
repair versus reconstruction jurisprudence.132

130

Wilson, 50 U.S. at 125-26 (focusing on what the inventor contemplated regarding
whether knives used in the patented machine would be replaced during the life of the
machine.)
The right . . . to replace the cutter-knives is not because they are
perishable materials, but because the inventor of the machine has so
arranged them as a part of its combination, that the machine could not
be continued in use without a succession of knives at short intervals.
Unless they were replaced, the invention would have been of little
use to the inventor or to others . . . . These, without having a definite
duration are contemplated by the inventor to last so long as the
materials of which they are formed can hold together in use in such a
combination . . . . With such intentions, they are put into the
structure . . . . [The] inventor cannot complain, if he sells the use of
his machine, that the purchaser uses it in the way the inventor meant
it to be used . . . .
Id. (emphasis added); see also Morgan, 152 U.S. at 434 (finding that replacing the toilet
paper on a patented toilet paper roll was not impermissible reconstruction because: the
purchaser of a new [toilet paper] roll does precisely what the patentee intended he should
do; he replaces that which is in its nature perishable and without the replacement of
which the remainder of the device is of no value); Sandvik Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 674
(finding that the evidence shows that plaintiff “never intended for its drills to be retipped.
It did not manufacture or sell replacement drill tips. It did not publish instructions on
how to retip or suggest [such]”).
131
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever invents
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefore, infringes the patent.” Id.; see also Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J. concurring) (stating that the patent
act leaves no room for deminimus or experimental use excuses for infringement because
intent is irrelevant to patent infringement so that an experimental use excuse cannot
survive). Note, however, that intent is an element of active inducement infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c).
132
See Gajarsa, supra note 28 at 1207-08.
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B. Exhaustion
In addition to limiting patent misuse, Mallinckrodt put
substantial restraints on the doctrine of patent exhaustion. In the
seminal case on patent exhaustion, Adams v. Burke,133 the Supreme
Court held that a patent right is “exhausted” by the first sale of the
patented product.134 Thus, any attempt to restrict the use of such
patented product, after it has passed into the stream of commerce,
is unenforceable under patent laws.135 This case was resolved
under patent law without any antitrust discussion, as the case was
decided prior to the Sherman Act.
Today, the “antitrust analogue to the [exhaustion doctrine] is the
doctrine of ‘restraints on alienation,’ utilized by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.”136 In Arnold, Schwinn,
the Court held that any restriction by a seller of a product with
respect to the resale of that product is per se illegal under the
antitrust laws.137 The Court, however, evaluated products where
the manufacturer retained title under the rule of reason.138 Arnold,
Schwinn was overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.139
In Continental T.V., the Court held that “vertical restrictions
133

84 U.S. 453 (1873).
See id.; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895). When
a patentee sells a patented article of manufacture, the Court said:
[I]t is obvious that a purchaser can use the article in any part of the
United States, and, unless restrained by contract with the patentee,
can sell or dispose of the same. It has passed outside of the
monopoly, and is no longer under the peculiar protection granted to
patented rights.
Id. at 663.
135
84 U.S. at 456.
136
Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19 (quoting United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
137
Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379.
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with
whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with
dominion over it . . . . Such restraints are so obviously destructive of
competition that their mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer
parts with dominion over his product or transfers risk of loss to
another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the conditions
of its resale.
Id.
138
Id. at 379-80.
139
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
134

WHITE.PP6

2001]

9/6/01 10:40 PM

A RULE FOR PATENT MISUSE

693

promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to
achieve efficiencies in the distribution.”140 These restrictions
allow sellers to regulate the amount of competition among their
retailers through territorial restrictions, increasing interbrand
competition.141 Thus, the Court held these restrictions should be
evaluated under the rule of reason.142 In particular, the Court noted
that there should be no distinction drawn between sale and nonsale transactions,143 the rule of reason should be applied in both
situations.144
The question then becomes: Is Adams in conflict with
Continental T.V.?145 Technically, Adams makes restraints on
patented products after sale unenforceable under patent law.146 It
could be viewed that the exhaustion doctrine merely places
patented products on an equal footing with unpatented products
when analyzing a licensor’s right to place restrictions on the
purchaser of the product under the antitrust laws.147 Following this
logic, the Federal Circuit, in Mallinckrodt, supported this
contention and rejected the doctrine of exhaustion as a basis for
antitrust liability and patent misuse.148
A further problem with Mallinckrodt is that it blurs the
distinction between contracting for a sale of goods and contracting
for patent rights.
There are different consequences when
contracting for a sale of goods versus contracting for patent rights.
Restrictions on patent rights travel downstream, while restrictions
on contracts do not. In other words, a patent owner may limit
rights granted under a patent license agreement to those not in

140

Id. at 55.
See id.
142
See id.
143
Id. at 57 (holding “that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale
transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a per se rule in one situation and
a rule of reason in the other . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule stated in
Schwinn must be overruled.”).
144
See id.
145
Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19. In Schwinn, at footnote 6, the Court
specifically excludes this analysis from applying to a patentee: “We have no occasion
here to consider whether a patentee has any greater rights in this respect.” 388 U.S. at 380
(citations omitted).
146
84 U.S. at 457 (holding that purchaser “acquire[s] the right to this use of it [the
patented device] freed from any claim of the patentee”).
147
Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19.
148
976 F.2d at 708.
141
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privity of contract.149 If a sale is not authorized, it may result in an
infringement.150 An authorized sale of a patented product,
however, places the product beyond the reach of the patent,
exhausting the patent rights.151 In contrast, a patent owner may
place conditions on a sale of a patented product through contract,
but such restrictions should apply only to those in privity of
contract.152 Generally, only those who are in privity of contract,
with the exception of intended beneficiaries,153 may sue on a
contract.154 The idea is that one who is not in privity of contract
cannot be sued on such contract; therefore, one not in privity
should not be able to sue on such contract either.155
Although the courts have not thoroughly discussed the impact of
determining whether a given contract covers a sale of goods or a
license of intellectual property rights, the courts have tangentially
examined this distinction. In both Wilson v. Rousseau156 and
Bloomer v. McQuewan,157 those who had purchased patented
149

35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1). A patentee has:
[T]he right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States, and if the invention is a process, of
the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States,
products made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof.
Id.; McCoy v. Mitsubishi, 67 F.3d 917, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (recognizing that a “patent
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling what is described in its
claims.”)
150
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
151
Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(emphasizing that patent exhaustion applies similarly to a sale of a patented product
manufactured by a licensee acting within the scope of its license).
152
VERNON V. PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY: THE HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW 853 (1992) (discussing the traditional rule
that “only a person who is a privity to a contract can sue on it). An exception to this rule
is for intended beneficiaries who may sue on a contract that was made directly for their
benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1977).
153
An exception to this principle has been made for third party intended beneficiaries.
See Seavor v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639, 641 (1918); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 274
(1859) (holding that one not in privity of contract, but who is an intended beneficiary on
the contract, may sue on such contract for breach).
154
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. There are situations in which a person
not in privity may have rights to sue on a contract, like a third party beneficiary or an
aggrieved buyer trying to sue a manufacturer on its warranty. Contrary to Mallinckrodt,
in these cases, the third parties are not being sued by a party to the contract.
155
See Seavor, 120 N.E. at 640.
156
45 U.S. 646 (1846).
157
55 U.S. 539 (Mem), 14 How. 539 (1852).
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machines during the patent’s original term were held to have the
right to continue using such machines after the patent term had
been renewed twice, without paying a second royalty.158 In its
opinions the Court made a distinction “between the grant of the
right to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to

158

There is no longer a provision for extension of patent term. In 1836, however,
Congress passed an act allowing for such extension:
And be it further enacted, that whenever any patentee of an invention
or discovery shall desire an extension of his patent beyond the term
of its limitation, he may make application therefore, in writing, to the
Commissioner of the Patent Office, setting forth the grounds thereof;
and the Commissioner shall, on the applicant’s paying the sum of
forty dollars to the credit of the treasury, as in the case of an original
application for a patent, cause to be published in one or more of the
principal newspapers in the city of Washington, and in such other
paper or papers as he may deem proper, published in the section of
country most interested adversely to the extension of the patent, a
notice of such application, and of the time and place when and where
the same will be considered, that any person may appear and show
cause why the extension should not be granted. And the Secretary of
State, the Commissioner of the Patent Office, and the Solicitor of the
Treasury shall constitute a board to hear and decide upon the
evidence produced before them, both for and against the extension,
and shall sit for that purpose at the time and place designated in the
published notice thereof. The patentee shall furnish to the said board
a statement in writing, under oath, of the ascertained value of the
invention, and of his receipts and expenditures, sufficiently in detail
to exhibit a true and faithful account of loss and profit in any manner
accruing to him from and by reason of said invention. And if, upon a
hearing of the matter, it shall appear to the full and entire satisfaction
of said board, having due regard to the public interest therein, that it
is just and proper that the term of the patent should be extended, by
reason of the patentee, without neglect or fault upon his part, having
failed to obtain, from the use and sale of his invention, a reasonable
remuneration for the time, ingenuity, and expense bestowed upon the
same, and the introduction thereof into use, it shall be the duty of the
Commissioner to renew and extend the patent, by making a
certificate thereon of such extension, for the term of seven years from
and after the expiration of the term; which certificate, with a
certificate of said board of their judgment and opinion as aforesaid,
shall be entered on record in the patent-office; and thereupon the said
patent shall have the same effect in law as though it had been
originally granted for the term of twenty-one years. And the benefit
of such renewal shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to
use the thing patented, to the extent of their respective interest
therein. Provided, however, that no extension of a patent shall be
granted after the expiration of the term for which it was originally
issued.
6 Stat. at Large, 678. Act approved 4th July, 1836, ch. 357. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45
U.S. 646, 658 (1846).
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use it.”159 The Court also stated that when a patentee sells the
exclusive privilege of making or vending the patented invention
for use in a particular place, “the purchaser buys a portion of the
franchise which the patent confers. The patentee cannot sell [the
exclusive rights] for a longer time. And the purchaser buys with
reference to that [limited] period.”160
But when a purchaser buys the patented invention itself, the
purpose of using it stands on different ground. “In using it, he
exercises no rights . . .[granted] by Congress nor does [the title
come from] the . . . exclusive privilege granted to the patentee.”161
When the machine passes to the purchaser, it no longer lies within
the limits of the monopoly.162 “It passes outside of it.”163 Thus,
the patented invention becomes the individual property of the
purchaser, it is individual property, no longer protected by federal
laws, but by the laws of the State in which the property lies.164 The
right is expended under what is called the doctrine of patent
exhaustion.
II. THE PROPOSED TEST
Several cases have been heard at the Federal Circuit where
single use restrictions were placed on patented devices.165 In some
of these cases, the outcome would have changed or the questions
asked would have been different if the test proposed in this article
was used. In particular, Mallinckrodt166 would have had a different
outcome. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that if a patentee’s
“single use only” restriction was a valid condition of sale, this
restriction is not excluded from enforcement under patent law.167
Such a restriction does not “per se violate the doctrine of patent
misuse or the antitrust law, provided that no other law prevents
159

Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852).
Id. at 549.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 549-50 (discussing that the purchasers derive no advantage for the patentee’s
patent extension).
165
See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed Cir. 1997); Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121
F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997); The Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
166
976 F.2d 700 (1992).
167
Id. at 701.
160
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enforcement of the patent.”168
The proposed test requires that the doctrine of per se patent
misuse be applied in cases where: (1) a reuse restriction is not
made with respect to a separate product; and (2) where the
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the lifespan of the device outlasts the single use. Because the single use
restriction in Mallinckrodt was not a restriction on a separate
product, the first prong of the test is met. Secondly, the second
prong is satisfied because the single use restriction on the patented
devices forces the buyer into purchasing more uses than is
necessary since the general life-span of the patented devices
outlasts a single use. Thus, such a restriction should be considered
a per se patent misuse violation. After Mallinckrodt, single use
restrictions no longer amounted to per se patent misuse.169
Consequently, most cases were argued under other theories.170
Another case where the patent holder utilized a single use
restriction is Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus,171 a post-Mallinckrodt
case where the issue of patent misuse was not raised. Instead, the
court’s decision rested on the permissible repair doctrine.172 In
Sage Prods., the court focused on the patent holder’s intent
regarding the single use and whether the replaced part was
“spent.”173
Sage Products (“Sage”) was the assignee to Reissue Patent No.
33,413 (the “‘413 patent”) having claims drawn to a disposal
system for contaminated items, particularly those used in a
hospital.174 The “413 patent” comprised an “outer enclosure” that
could be mounted on a wall, and a cooperating, “removable inner

168

Id. at 702.
See, e.g., B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(ruling that district court erred in instructing jury that use restrictions amounted to patent
misuse without an evaluation under the rule of reason).
170
See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard, 123 F. 3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that
defendant’s modification of Hewlett-Packard’s patented ink cartridge was a noninfringing permissible repair).
171
45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
172
Id. at 1577 (where plaintiff “alleges that hospitals which replace the removable
inner containers of its patented combination with Devon’s containers are impermissibly
reconstructing the” plaintiff’s patented device).
173
Id. at 1578.
174
Id. at 1577.
169
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container.”175 The inner container was placed inside the outer
enclosure.176 “The removable inner container [was] an unpatented
element of the ‘413 combination.”177 When the inner container
was full with contaminated items, it was removed from the outer
enclosure, and preferably discarded.178
Sage marked a
“BIOHAZARD – SINGLE USE ONLY” warning on the
containers, the idea being that a single use corresponded to a full
inner container.179 Sage’s sales literature also instructed customers
to discard the inner containers once they were full to comply with
the single use restriction.180
In addition to selling the disposal system as a unit, Sage also
sold replacement inner containers.181 Sage sold far more inner
containers than combinations of inner containers and outer
enclosures.182 Sale of inner containers is a sizeable market.183
Although the “‘413 patent discourag[ed] reuse, it [was]
physically possible to empty, clean, and reuse the commercial
embodiment of the inner container.”184 This, however, was
difficult and could damage to the inner container.185 Nevertheless,
the inner containers were sometimes reused and Sage,
subsequently, refused to sell directly to buyers that reused the
containers.186
Devon, the defendant, manufactured and sold an inner container
that could be used with a wall bracket made by either Devon or by
175

45 F.3d at 1576 (citing the language from the claims in the patent at issue).
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1577 (noting that “[t]he specification states that the inner container is
intended to be disposable and is preferably discarded when full . . . . Proper disposal,
such as incineration, of filled inner containers prevents improper reuse of, and possible
contamination or spread of disease.”).
179
Id.
180
Id. (noting that “Sage actively campaigns against reuse of inner containers and has
even refused to sell directly to buyers which reuse the containers”).
181
Sage, 45 F.3d 1575.
182
Id. (attributing the discrepancy in sales to the fact that “outer enclosures could last
indefinitely under normal use”).
183
Id. (noting that “Sage claims that its disposal systems are sold at over half of the
hospitals in the United States”).
184
Id. at 1577.
185
Id.
186
Id; see also supra note 180.
176

WHITE.PP6

2001]

9/6/01 10:40 PM

A RULE FOR PATENT MISUSE

699

Sage.187 Devon did not manufacture an outer enclosure that,
together with Devon’s inner container, would have infringed the
‘413 patent.188
Sage sued Devon, alleging that the hospitals directly infringed
the ‘413 patent by using Devon replacement containers with
Sage’s outer enclosure.189 Sage argued that the replacement
impermissibly reconstructed the ‘413 patented combination,
meaning Devon either actively induced infringement or was a
contributory infringer.190 Sage contended that any entity that made
the inner container infringed the patent, even though the inner
container was an unpatented element of a combination.191 To
avoid being liable as an infringer, Devon alleged that replacing the
inner container was permissible repair.192
At trial, the court granted Devon’s motion for partial summary
judgment holding that replacing the inner containers was
permissible repair.193 Sage appealed. The dispute on appeal was
whether or not undamaged, filled, inner containers were considered
“spent,” so that that their replacement was considered permissible
repair.194 Sage conceded that replacing a damaged container
would be permissible repair.195 According to Sage, that was not
the case because the replaced containers were not “spent,” used up,
or in need of repair.196 In order to determine whether or not the
replaced containers were spent, the court looked to Sage’s
intent.197 This analysis is confusing because determining a
patentee’s intent and whether the device is “spent” should be
independent from one another.198
187

Sage, 45 F.3d 1575.
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 1578.
193
Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577. “[T]he district court held that there was no genuine issue of
material fact about whether the inner container was a disposable element of the patented
combination, and that replacing the container constituted permissible repair of the Sage
system.” Id.
194
Id. at 1578.
195
Id. “Sage does not suggest that replacing a damaged inner container is
reconstruction.” Id.
196
Id. at 1578.
197
Id. (relying on “Sage’s marketing of its sharps disposal units” to reject the
argument that the “inner containers could be reused”).
198
Sage, 45 F.3d at 1578. Here, the court determined that Sage’s intent determines
188
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First, the court noted that Sage labeled the inner containers
“SINGLE USE ONLY,” meaning Sage intended the containers to
be discarded when full.199 Furthermore, “Sage admitted that it
intended that its customers not reuse its containers and [had]
refused to deal directly with distributors and users who [did].”200
The court then concluded that an article is effectively spent “when
it is neither practical nor feasible to continue using an element that
is intended to be replaced.”201 The court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment grant, finding that the defendants engaged in
permissible repair and did not contributorily infringe the subject
patent.202
The courts’ choice to focus on Sage’s intent is problematic since
the court said that it would have come out differently had it been
practical to continue to use the inner container.203 Sage argued that
the patent claimed a “removable” inner container, and not a
“disposable” one.204 In the future, Sage proposed, there may be a
way to safely dispose of the waste, without discarding the inner
container along with the waste.205 The court went so far as to
admit that it might have decided the case differently had this been
the case:
If those were the facts, our conclusion that this is
permissible repair might be different . . . . But here,
following the teaching of the ‘413 patent, Sage
commercialized a unit designed for safe removal
and disposal of hazardous waste. It intended that its
customers dispose of inner containers and went to
great lengths to ensure that they did.206
The problem with using the permissible repair versus
impermissible reconstruction analysis is that it yields different
whether or not the inner container is spent.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1577.
201
Id. at 1578 (citing Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 303).
202
Id. at 1579.
203
Id. (citing FMC Corp. v. Up-Right Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
204
Sage, 45 F.3d at 1579; see U.S. Patent No. 4,715,498 (reissue no. 33,413) (issued
Dec. 29, 1987). Claim 1d., the patent-in-suit, describing the inner container as: “A
disposal system comprising . . . a removable inner container disposed within said outer
enclosure, said inner container including an inlet in registration with . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added).
205
Sage, 45 F.3d 1575.
206
Id. at 1579.
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results depending on whether the thing intended to be replaced is
considered “spent.” Thus, the court might have found that reusing
the inner container, if it was not considered spent, would have
amounted to impermissible reconstruction, triggering patent
infringement without looking at anticompetitive effect. The more
important focus rests on whether the anticompetitive restriction on
reuse expands the patent’s original scope as to effect misuse of the
patent.
In Sage Prods., the court was troubled by Sage’s attempt to
hold Devon liable for infringement for supplying an unpatented
element that Sage, itself, recommended replacing:207 “[Sage] thus
seeks to keep for itself a market in parts which are intended to be
periodically replaced — this is no more than an attempt to expand
patent rights to an unpatented product.”208
The problem was not Sage’s intent regarding how often a part
was to be replaced. Rather, it was that Sage was trying to expand
its monopoly coverage to the inner container, an unpatented
element not privy to exclusive rights coverage under the patent.209
The proposed test focuses on this issue.210 In applying the
proposed test, per se patent misuse should be triggered. The
proposed test requires that the doctrine of per se patent misuse
should be applied in cases where: (1) a reuse restriction is not
made with respect to a separate product; and (2) where the
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the lifespan of the device outlasts the single use.
First, the restriction is not made with respect to a separate
product. According to the restriction, the entire patented device
can be used only until the inner container is full.211 Consequently,
this restriction is on the entire device and not tied to a separate
product. In fact, replacing the container with a Sage inner
container would technically infringe. If this occurred, however,
Sage would probably still sue because its goal in this litigation was
to eliminate its competition so that it might sell all of the
replacement containers, where it makes its largest profit margin.
207
208
209
210
211

Id. at 1579.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part II.
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
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Second, the “SINGLE USE ONLY” restriction forces the buyer to
purchase something that need not be bought in fixed proportion to
the patented device’s further uses. This is like Mallinckrodt, where
any use beyond a single use was prohibited.212
Notice that Sage was not suing its customers, the hospitals, but
instead chose to sue a competitor that made replacement inner
containers.213 Sage wanted to supply replacement inner containers
and keep the competition from taking away this business. Under
the Act, Sage is permitted to tie sales of the inner containers to the
tying product, the patented device, “unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the . . . sale is
conditioned.214 In this case, Sage probably did have market power
in the relevant market since Sage sold to over half of the hospitals
in the United States.215 Under the rule of reason, Sage would
probably have to sell the replacement containers at a competitive
price to avoid an antitrust violation.216 Instead of characterizing
the transaction as a tying arrangement, Sage avoided this by
placing a single use restriction on its device.217
In another case, Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Tech.,218 the
patentee placed a single use restriction on an unpatented element of
a patented device. In this case, Kendall, the assignee of U.S.
Patent No. 4,253,449 (“‘449 patent”) drawn to a medical device for
applying compressive pressure to a patient’s limb in order to
increase blood flow.219 The patent is a combination patent having
three components: a pump, a pair of pressurized sleeves; and
connecting tubes.220
Kendall sold an embodiment of an invention, called the SCD
system, to health facilities.221 Included in the SCD System was a
pump, a tubing assembly, and a plurality of sleeves.222 In order to
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577.
See id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
See Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577.
Id.
Id.
85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1571.
Id.
Id. at 1572.
Id. at 1571. “The patented device is comprised of three basic components: a
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discourage reuse of the pressure sleeves on the device, Kendall
placed a notice on the sleeve packaging that read, “For Single
Patient Use Only. Do not Reuse.”223 According to Kendall, the
purpose for this notice was for hygienic reasons, since the sleeves
might become contaminated with a patient’s blood or other bodily
fluids.224 Although most customers replaced the sleeves after each
use, not all of them purchased sleeves from Kendall.225 Some
purchased sleeves from Progressive Medical Technology
(“Progressive”), the defendant.226 In any event, Kendall’s sale of
replacement sleeves accounted for about $80 million out of $85
million dollars in total annual sales.227
Consequently, Kendall sued Progressive for contributory
infringement.228 The trial court granted Progressive’s motion for
partial summary judgment of noninfringement based on the repair
doctrine, holding that Kendall’s customers acted within their right
to repair the SCD system by replacing the pressure sleeves after
each use.229 Without direct infringement, the court could not find
contributory infringement.230 Kendall appealed. The issue on
appeal was whether purchasers of Kendall’s complete SCD system
“directly infringed the ‘449 patent when they replaced the pressure
sleeves after a single use with sleeves purchased from someone
other than Kendall.”231
In order to determine direct infringement, the court analyzed
whether Kendall’s customers had an implied license to replace the
pressure sleeves after each use.232 The court found that Kendall
had granted its customers an implied license to use the device for
its useful life.233 Given this implied license, Kendall’s customers
had the “right to repair the patented article and necessarily to

controller-pneumatic pump for supplying pressurized fluid, a pair of pressure sleeves that
wrap around a patient’s limbs and controlling tubes.” Id.
223
Id. at 1572.
224
Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570.
231
Id. at 1573.
232
See id.
233
Id.
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purchase repair parts from others.”234 The court characterized
Kendall’s sale as one without restriction, such that direct
infringement could only occur with complete reconstruction of the
device.235 Replacement of individual unpatented components was
considered permissible repair.236
In Kendall, the court followed the reasoning in Sage and said the
sleeves were effectively spent, since reusing the sleeves would not
have been feasible due to the risk of contamination.237 Again, the
court looked at the patentee’s intent. The court noted Kendall’s
mark on the sleeve packaging, “For Single Patient Use Only. Do
Not Reuse,” showed Kendall’s intent that it permitted its customers
to replace the sleeves.238
The court then distinguished Kendall from Mallinckrodt,239
claiming that in Kendall the customers followed the single use
restriction rather than ignoring it.240 Furthermore, the “single use
only” restriction in Mallinckrodt referred to reusing the entire
patented device.241 Thus, customers could not buy replacement
parts under an implied license theory. In addition, Kendall’s
customers were under no contractual obligation to purchase the
replacement sleeves from Kendall under the “single patient use”
restriction.242
Kendall was more similar to Sage than to Mallinckrodt. As in
Sage, the court focused on the replacement of the sleeves as
permissible repair and not impermissible reconstruction.243 Similar
to the inner container in Sage, the sleeves were part of the patented
combination, but not separately patented.244 The problem was not
234

Id.
Id. at 1574.
236
Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570.
237
Id. at 1574 (“This court has never said that an element is spent only when it is
impossible to reuse it. [W]hen it is neither practical nor feasible to continue using an
element that is intended to be replaced, that element is effectively spent”) (quoting Sage,
45 F.3d at 1578).
238
Id. at 1575.
239
Compare Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996), with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
240
Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1576.
241
Id. at 1575.
242
Id. at 1576.
243
Id.
244
Claim 1 is illustrative:
A device for applying compressive pressures against a patient’s limb
from a source of pressurized fluid, comprising:
235
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Kendall’s intent, but that it was trying to expand its monopoly
beyond that which was granted under the patent. Application of
the proposed test would trigger patent misuse.245
First, the restriction is not made with respect to a separate
product. According to the restriction, the entire patented device
can only be used once the sleeves have been used once.246
Consequently, this restriction is on the entire device and not tied to
a separate product. Second, the “SINGLE USE ONLY” restriction
forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in
fixed proportion to the patented devices’ further uses.247 This
situation is akin to Mallinckrodt, where any use beyond a single
use was prohibited.248
In order to control the use of the sleeves, Kendall should have
secured a design patent on them. This action is exemplified in the
court’s comment concerning counsel’s plea that the “sky is
falling”:
At oral argument, Kendall’s counsel made a “sky is
falling” plea, pointing out that an affirmance of the
district court’s decision would make it
uneconomical for companies to invent and develop
devices like that involved in this case, because
much of the profit arises from sale of the
replaceable sleeves rather than from sale of the
a pair of first and second elongated pressure sleeves for enclosing a
length of the patient’s limbs, with said sleeves each having a plurality
of fluid pressure chambers;
a first set of plurality conduits in communication with chambers in
said first sleeve;
a second set of a plurality of conduits in communication with
chambers in said second sleeve, with the number of conduits in said
second set being the same as the number of conduits in said first set;
a third set of a plurality of conduits in communication with said
source, with the number of conduits in said third set being the same
as the number of conduits in said first and second sets; and means for
connecting the conduits of said first and second sets with each
conduit in the third set being connected to only one conduit in each of
said first and second sets to establish communication between the
source and the first and second sleeves.
U.S. Patent No. 4,253,449 (issued Mar. 3, 1981) (emphasis added).
245
See discussion infra Part II.
246
See discussion infra Part II.
247
See discussion infra Part II.
248
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700.
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original device. If that is so, we are not of course in
a position to guess whether the result is related to
the pricing of the original device, the failure to
obtain effective patent protection for the replaceable
sleeve, or other factors.249
Kendall still controls the marketing of the device. As in Sage,
Kendall sells the replacement parts.250 Under the PMRA, Kendall
may tie sales of the sleeves to the tying product, the patented
device, “unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the . . . sale is conditioned.” 251 Whether Kendall
has market power is unclear, but to avoid an antitrust violation
under the rule of reason, Kendall would probably have to sell the
replacement sleeves at a competitive price.252
Instead of
characterizing the transaction as a tying arrangement, Kendall
avoided this by placing a single use restriction on its device.253
A case having issues similar to Mallinckrodt is Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.254 In this case, HewlettPackard Co. (“HP”), had numerous patents on inventions dealing
with ink jet printing technology.255 HP manufactures and sells ink
jet printers having disposable ink jet cartridges.256 “Once the ink
in a cartridge has been depleted, HP expects the cartridge to be
discarded and replaced by a new one.”257 In fact, HP disclaims any
liability for damage to its printers from cartridges that have been
refilled.258 HP advises the user to “discard old print cartridge
immediately.”259 HP also warns its customers that print quality

249

Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1576.
Id. at 1572.
251
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
252
“Under the rule of reason, ‘the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’”
Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 860 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
253
See Kendall, 85 F.2d at 1572.
254
123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
255
Id. at 1447.
256
Id. at 1446.
257
Id. at 1447.
258
Id.
259
Id.
250
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may be damaged through refilling the print cartridges.260
Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Co. (“ROT”) purchased two types
of HP ink jet cartridges, one designed for color printing, the other
for black and white printing.261 Both were designed to be nonrefillable.262 ROT disregarded HP’s advice to “[d]iscard the old
print cartridge immediately.”263 Instead, ROT purchased these
cartridges and “modif[ied] them so that they will be refillable, and
then [resold] them as refillable ink jet cartridges.”264 In addition,
ROT sold these cartridges in kits including both the modified
cartridge and color ink refills.265 HP did not manufacture or supply
this ink.266 ROT had a patent for this cartridge modification that
covered the product and the process.267
HP then sued ROT for patent infringement on its twelve
patents.268 At trial, the district court ruled in favor of ROT on the
patent infringement claims, and granted summary judgment of
noninfringement.269
The court articulated the dispositive point in the case to be
whether the modification was authorized or whether such
modification exceeded the original scope of the implied license.270
In its examination, the court focused on HP’s unconditional sale of
the cartridges as the reason for why there was no infringement:271
Generally, when a seller sells a product without restriction, it in
effect promises the purchaser that in exchange for the price paid, it
will not interfere with the purchaser’s full enjoyment of the
260

Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1447.
Id.
262
Id. at 1448.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
The cartridge designed for black and white printing is refillable with color ink
through ROT’s patented apparatus and method. Id. at 1449.
266
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1449.
267
Id. at 1448; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,408,256 (issued Apr. 18, 1995) (entitled
“Refillable Color Ink Jet Cartridge and Method for Making Said Cartridge”).
268
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1449-50.
269
Id. at 1449. Note that trademark issues are significant here, because the customer
is likely to be confused as from which source this product comes. These are actual HP
cartridges, but the modification is not made by HP and HP does not warranty their use in
its printers. As such, HP won its summary judgment motion regarding trademark
infringement. This ruling was not appealed. Id.
270
Id. at 1451.
271
Id.
261
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purchased product. The buyer has an implied license under any
patents of the seller that dominate the product or any uses of the
product to which the parties might reasonably contemplate the
product will be put.272
In this case, the court noted that it was clear that HP sold the
cartridges ROT purchased without restriction, and no breach of
contract was asserted.273 Failing to restrict the sales, HP lost the
right to enforce any of its patents relating to the cartridges sold to
exclude the purchaser from using or selling them.274 Neither the
cap nor the ink are recited elements of the claims, thus the
modification or replacement of the cartridges could not constitute
infringement.275
The court also discussed whether modifying the caps on the
cartridges, so that they could be refilled, is more akin to
permissible repair than to impermissible reconstruction.276 The
cap modification is not conventional repair since the caps on the
cartridges are not broken or defective.277 The modification is also
not reconstruction, since the cartridge, as a combination, is not
spent.278 “Furthermore, ROT does not replace any of the elements
recited in the claims.”279
“HP’s unilateral intentions cannot change the fact that ROT had
only modified an unused cartridge that HP sold without
restriction.”280 Again, the court looked to the useful life of the
patented product being substantially longer than the life of a single
reservoir of ink.281 The court, however, cited Mallinckrodt stating
that “absent a restriction having contractual significance, a
purchase carries with it the right to modify as long as
reconstruction of a spent product does not occur.”282
Repeat-O-Type rejects the idea that a seller’s intent creates a
limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell or modify, absent
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

Id. at 1451.
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1451.
Id. at 1451-52 (citing Aro II, 377 U.S. at 685).
See id. at 1451 (outlaying ROT’s arguments for noninfringement).
Id. at 1452 (citing Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at 1575).
Id.
Id.
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1452.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709.
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a contractual agreement making such restriction.283 Instead,
Repeat-O-Type was decided on the basis of the exhaustion
doctrine.284 Because HP only “expected” that the toner cartridges
would be discarded after they became empty, there was no
contractual “single use restriction” utilized.285 If, however, HP had
contractually restricted the toner cartridges to one use, this would
have amounted to misuse under the proposed test as long as HP did
not have a patent on the ink or its use.286
In applying the proposed test, prong one is satisfied because the
restriction on reusing the toner cartridge was not made on a
separate product. The restriction forces the buyer to purchase
another cartridge, when the cartridge still has a useful life, but just
needs to be refilled. Thus, the second prong is also satisfied.
III. CONCLUSION
The contemporary law of patents recognizes its own
anticompetitive effects and embeds the doctrine of patent misuse to
limit these effects. Focusing only on the level of competition in
the market, the antitrust laws police anticompetitive effect. In
recent years, there has been a shift away from applying the
common law doctrine of patent misuse.287 Because antitrust and
patent misuse flow from different theoretical foundations, one
should not completely replace the other. Some anticompetitive
behavior still needs to be curtailed when an antitrust violation
cannot be proven.
After reviewing the pertinent case law, it is evident that the
courts have eroded the patent misuse doctrine beyond what is
statutorily required under the Patent Misuse Reform Act,288
(PMRA), without deriving any added pro-competitive benefit as
was originally contemplated by Congress. Such erosion has
assisted patentees in masking any anticompetitive effect that could
283

Id. at 1453.
See infra Part I.B.
285
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1454.
286
See infra Part II.
287
See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual Property
Law Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 167 (2000).
288
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
284
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be lessened by proper application of patent misuse. In order to
reinvigorate the historical application of patent misuse, a new test
should be used to determine when patent misuse should be applied.
Patent misuse should be found when: (1) a reuse restriction is not
made with respect to a separate product; and (2) where the
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the lifespan of the device outlasts the single use.

